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NOTE

Pennsylvania's New Mental Health
Procedures Act: Due Process
and the Right to Treatment
for the Mentally Ill
I.

Introduction
In July 1976 the Mental Health Procedures Act 1 (MHPA), the first

major overhaul of Pennsylvania mental health legislation in ten years, was
signed into law. 2 Its predecessor, the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 19663 (MH-MRA), had been severely buffeted by constitutional challenges 4 and its validity had been cast into doubt by several United
States Supreme Court decisions. 5 Just one day before the signing of the
1976 bill, yet another provision of the MH-MRA was declared unconstitutional.'
During the past ten years a ground swell of support for the rights of

mental patients and a concommitant increase in legal challenges to anti1. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L.- , No. 143 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§
7101-503 (Purdon)) [hereinafter cited as MHPA].
2. The Act became effective 60 days after enactment, but as to persons who were
involuntarily committed prior to the effective date it becomes effective "180 days thereafter."MHPA § 501.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1976) (now repealed in
part by the MHPA).
4. See Goldy v. Beal, No. 75-791 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 8, 1976) (civil court commitment
standard vague); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), prob. juris. noted
424 U.S. 964 (1976) (voluntary commitment of minors by parents denies due process); Dixon
v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (commitment upon certificates of two
physicians denies due process); Commonwealth v. McBurse, - Pa. -, 348 A.2d 423 (1975)
(indefinite commitment of incompetent defendant denied due process); Commonwealth v.
McQuaid, 464 Pa. 499, 347 A.2d 465 (1975) (indefinite commitment of criminal defendant
awaiting trial denies equal protection); cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa.
Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975) (judicially engrafting due process requirements upon
involuntary commitment provisions).
5. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (involuntary commitment of
non-dangerous individual denied due process); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
(indefinite commitment of criminal defendant on basis of incompetency to stand trial denied
equal protection); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (equal protection and due process
rights do not depend on whether proceedings are deemed civil or criminal).
6. See Goldy v. Beal, No. 75-791 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 8, 1976) (civil court commitment
standard unconstitutionally vague). This decision was filed July 8; the MHPA was signed by
the Governor on July 9.

quated commitment procedures have led to a reevaluation of mental health
law. 7 Two major demands have been made: first, that once patients are
admitted they be given adequate treatment designed to alleviate or cure
their illness; 8 and second, that commitment procedures incorporate due
9
process guarantees similar to those found in the criminal justice system.
With regard to the first of these demands, the Supreme Court has
declined to decide whether mental patients have a constitutional right to
adequate treatment."0 Accordingly, the new Pennsylvania law provides a
statutory right. The MHPA declares that it is the policy of the Commonwealth to assure the availability of adequate treatment for the mentally ill;"I
it commands that adequate treatment "shall be provided to all persons in
treatment who are subject to this act."' 2 It is hoped that this noble goal
3
will be reached despite practical constraints.'
To implement this right to treatment and to provide due process
guarantees, the MHPA established new procedures for voluntary and
involuntary treatment of the mentally ill and for dealing with problems of
criminal responsibility and incompetency to stand trial in the criminal
courts of the Commonwealth. In examining the new procedures of the Act,
particular attention will be given to the manner in which the new law meets
the objections raised to the old.
7.

See, e.g., McGarry & Kaplan, Overview: Current Trends in MentalHealth Law, in

R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & J. RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 344 (rev. & exp. ed.

1975) [hereinafter cited as ALLEN].
8. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F.
Supp. 686 (N.D. 11. 1973). See also Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 742 (1969); Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Katz, The
Right to Treatment-An EnchantingLegalFiction, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755 (1969); Note, Civil
Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967); Symposium,
The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969).
9. See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d
393 (10th Cir. 1968); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Commonwealth exrel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa.
Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975). See also N. KIrrRIE, THE RIGHTTO BE DIFFERENT 79-95
(1971).
10. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975). In a controversial decision
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama declared that the lack of
adequate treatment in the mental facilities of that state denied a constitutional right to
adequate treatment. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Until that decision was rendered, if any right
to treatment existed, it was a product of legislative rather than constitutional mandate. See,
e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also sources cited note 8 supra.
It should be noted that "right to treatment" refers to treatment rather than mere
confinement and custodial care of an individual who has already been admitted to a mental
health facility. It does not imply that there is a "right to admission."
I1. MHPA § 102.
12. Id. § 104. This places Pennsylvania among the few states that guarantee such a right.
13. One of the criticisms leveled at the Act was the lack of the increased funding needed
to compensate for additional burdens placed upon both the mental health and judicial
systems. The Act requires frequent examination of patients, mandates regular review of each
patient's program of treatment, and requires more judicial hearings than its predecessor. See
Hearings on S.B. 1025 Before the Pennsylvania Senate Committee on Public Health and
Welfare (October 1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (statements of F. L. Bartlett, Pa.
Ass'n of State Mental Hosp. Physicians; F. S. Beal, Sec'y of Public Welfare; R. B. Goril,
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Administrators Ass'n of Pa., Inc.; A. M. Hostetter,
Pa. Psychiatric Soc'y; S. Nelson, Comprehensive Mental Health Planning Comm.).

II.

General Provisions of the MHPA

The MHPA does not entirely repeal the MH-MRA of 1966.14 The policy of the MHPA is to "assure the availability of adequate treatment to
persons who are mentally ill."' 5 The MH-MRA, on the other hand,
governed the treatment of persons who were mentally impaired, mentally
deficient, or mentally retarded as well as those who were mentally ill. 16 For
purposes of the new legislation, persons diagnosed as mentally retarded,
senile, alcoholic or drug dependent are not considered mentally ill on that
17
basis alone.
The MHPA governs the rights and procedures for voluntary inpatients
and for all involuntary patients at mental health facilities in the Commonwealth. 8 Several provisions of the legislation apply to all mental patients
regardless of whether their treatment is voluntary or involuntary. First,
each person is given an examination before treatment is commenced.' 9
20
Second, a "treatment plan" is formulated for each individual patient.
Third, each patient must undergo a re-examination and review of his
21
treatment plan at least once each thirty days.

A.

The Treatment Plan

The concept of a treatment plan is new to Pennsylvania statutory law
and reflects the emphasis placed on treatment, rather than mere custodial
confinement, by the MHPA. 2 2 The term embodies the concept of a
14. The Act repeals all parts of prior acts that are inconsistent, but since the 1966
MH-MRA was broader in scope than the MHPA, it is only partially repealed. See MHPA § 502
(a) (MH-MRA definitions of mental disability repealed except as they relate to mental
retardation).
The regulations adopted by the Secretary of Public Welfare include the following
statement:
The Act establishes new procedures for the treatment of mentally ill persons. The
Act and the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, as amended, work
concurrently to provide the Commonwealth's policy on mental health services.
Department of Public Welfare, Mental Health Admission and Commitment Procedures
Regulations § 7100.1.4(A), 6 PA. BULL. 2113, 2116 [hereinafter cited as Regs.].
15. MHPA § 102 (emphasis added).
16.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 4102 (Purdon 1969) (definition of mental disability).

17. MHPA § 102.
18. Id. § 103. "Facility" is defined to include "any mental health establishment,
hospital, clinic, institution, center, day care center, base service unit, community mental
health center, or part thereof." Id. Thus both private and public facilities are covered by the
Act. Section 105 of the Act requires state approval of facilities receiving public funds. See id.
§ 105. This requirement extends to facilities providing only voluntary outpatient treatment,
although the Act does not otherwise apply to them. See id. §§ 103,105; Regs. §7100.1.5.1.(A),
6 PA. BULL. at 2117.

19. MHPA §§ 205, 302(b). Examination is made upon motion of a party or the court's
own order when a court is petitioned to issue an order for involuntary treatment. Id. §
304(c)(5).
20. Id. § 106.
21. Id. § 108. There is, however, an apparent conflict with the provision that persons
found incompetent to stand trial must be reexamined at least once each 60 days. See id. §
403(c). A solution, of course, is to follow the thirty-day requirements of § 108.
22. The word "treatment" is used repetitively throughout the Act. This is in stark
contrast to the use of the word "commitment" in the MH-MRA. "Commitment" is virtually
absent from the MHPA; its use in the first sentence of § 201 of the Act and in the title of the
regulations is, presumably, an oversight. Nevertheless, since there exists in common parlance
a significant difference between "commitment" (the act or process of induction into a mental
health care facility) and "treatment" (that which the patient receives once committed),

comprehensive program of inpatient or outpatient treatment designed to
meet the needs of the specific individual.2 3

The components of a treatment plan are not specificially outlined by
the law, but a general picture can be gathered from various provisions.
Adequate treatment, as defined by the Act, should be "a course of
treatment designed and administered to alleviate a person's pain and
distress and to maximize the probability of his recovery.... ".24Treatment is to include whatever diagnosis, evaluation, therapy or rehabilitation
is needed to meet those objectives, but the course of treatment "shall
impose the least restrictive alternative consistent with affording the person
adequate treatment for his condition. "25 Thus, the various alternatives of
inpatient treatment, partial hospitalization and outpatient treatment are to
be considered. Moreover, it would appear that consideration must also be
given to the accommodations available for inpatients as well as oppor26
tunities for recreation, education and medical care.
The formulation of a treatment plan is the responsibility of a team of
mental health professionals that must include at least one physician and

must be under the direction of a physician or licensed clinical psychologist. 7 "To the extent possible, the plan shall be made with the coopera,,28 For
tion, understanding and consent of the person in treatment ....
continued use of the term "commitment" in its proper sense would seem appropriate. The
recent change in emphasis, far from constituting mere euphemistic issue-avoidance, focuses
upon the substance of present day reforms: patients are accepted for treatment, not
committed to custodial care.
23. While the Act does not purport to regulate procedures of voluntary outpatient
examination and treatment, it is clear that the alternative of outpatient treatment should be
considered for any voluntary or involuntary candidate for inpatient treatment.
24. MHPA § 104.
25. Id. § 104, 107. See also id. § 102 (statement of policy); id. § 108(c)(5). The
regulations are somewhat more specific:
A comprehensive individualized plan of treatment shall:
2. be based upon diagnostic evaluation which includes examination of the
medical, psychological, social, behavorial [sic], educational, and developmental
aspects of the patient's situation.
3. set forth treatment objectives and prescribe an integrated program of
therapies, activities, and experiences designed to meet these objectives.
Full consideration shall be given to alternative less restrictive forms of
treatment.
Regs. § 7100.1.6.2, 6 PA. BULL. at 2117.

26. See MHPA § 104.
27. Id. §106.
28. Id. § 107. The regulations require that the plan "be formulated with the consultation
of the patient, his or her family, or legal guardian to the extent feasible." Regs. §
7100.1.6.2(A)(1), 6 PA. BULL. at 2117. To this end, the plan is to be written in terms easily
understood by the patient. Id. § 7100.1.6.2 (D).
Each facility is to establish an appeal procedure so that a patient may obtain independent
review of the treatment plan if he or she objects to the plan formulated by the in-house
treatment team. Regs. § 7100.1.6.4, 6 PA. BULL. at 2117.
The language quoted in the text should be interpreted as requiring informed consent to
the specific type of treatment proposed by the treatment team. The "blanket" consent to
treatment given upon admission of a voluntary patient should not suffice, even though, as the
statute requires, the patient was informed of the treatment he "may" undergo. See MHPA §
203. Some courts have ruled that even involuntary patients have a right to refuse certain
treatments. E.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); New York City Health &
Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1972); see N. KirrRE, THE RIGHT TO BE

voluntary patients, the law requires that a treatment plan be formulated
within seventy-two hours after an application for examination and treatment is accepted. 29 No time limit is specified in the case of involuntary
patients, although the law clearly states that a treatment team shall
formulate a plan for every person in treatment under the Act. 30
Persons in treatment are to have periodic re-examination and review
of their treatment plans by a treatment team. 3 This periodic review is
clearly not intended to be a mere "paper review" of the type conducted in
at least one mental health facility under the prior law; 32 it is to be fully
documented and the recommendations of the treatment team are to be
supported by written reasons. 33 In conformity with the declared policy to
prefer voluntary to involuntary treatment and to employ the least restrictive
measures consistent with adequate treatment, the review should give
consideration to discharge from treatment or modification of the treatment
plan and not merely to whether or not the previous treatment should be
34

continued .
B.

The "Patient Bill of Rights"

1. General Civil Rights.-Other provisions of the new legislation
outline the rights and remedies of persons in treatment. Section 113 of the
Act provides that "[e]very person who is in treatment shall be entitled to all
other rights now or hereafter provided under the laws of the Commonwealth, in addition to any rights provided for in this act." 35 Unfortunately
this language is susceptible to two interpretations. It may be read as a
"savings clause," a provision designed to assure that any rights that have
been guaranteed to mental patients, or at least not expressly denied them,
shall be preserved. An alternative and broader interpretation would be that
mental patients are guaranteed all the rights of a citizen of the Commonwealth in addition to those expressly granted under the Act. The latter view
appears to be the interpretation placed upon the Act by the Department of
Public Welfare. 36 The regulations that have been issued repeat the lan386-94 (1971); Comment, Mental Health-The Right to Refuse Drug Therapy
Under "Emergency Restraint Statutes," II N. ENG. L. REV. 509 (1976); Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1344-58 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
See also note 49 infra.
29. MHPA § 205.
30. Id. § 106(a).
31.
Id. § 108(a).
32. See Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 972-73 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (discussion of review procedures used at Farview State Hospital). Under the MH-MRA, certain
admissions were to have been reviewed at least annually by a committee of the professional
staff at each facility. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402(d), 4404(d) (Purdon 1969). Other
provisions of the MH-MRA failed to specifiy that a review should be undertaken. See, e.g., id.
DIFFERENT

§§ 4406-08.
33. MHPA §108(c); Regs. § 7100.1.6.3, 6 PA. BULL. at 2117.
34. See MHPA § 108(a). The treatment team must certify that its recommended
treatment is available and will be provided to the pateint. Id. § 108(c)(6); Regs. §
7100.1.6.3(D)(6), 6 PA. BULL. at 2117.
35.

MHPA § 113.

36.

See Regs. §§ 7100.1.10.1-.4, 6 PA. BULL. at 2119.

guage of section 113 and then provide that "persons subject to treatment in
accordance with these regulations shall retain all civil rights that have not

been specifically curtailed by a separate judicial or administrative
determination.... ."37
The interpretation adopted by the public welfare department is in
accord with the modern movement toward increasing the rights of mental

patients and should be the interpretation placed upon the Act by the
38

courts.
The regulations also detail some of the rights guaranteed to mental
patients. Among these are the right to assemble peacefully, the right to
engage in unrestricted and private communications, the right to make
complaints, the right to freely practice religion, the right to be secure in
their possessions, the right to conduct personal affairs, and the right to
39
receive compensation for work performed.
2. Records-Confidentiality and Access. -Patients are to have a
right of access to records concerning their treatment, although the Act does
not specifically so provide. The regulations state that access can be denied
if disclosure would be detrimental to the treatment of the individual or if
disclosure would reveal the identity of persons who have provided infor-

mation on an anonymous basis. Any such denial must be noted in the
patients' records along with a statement of the reasons for the denial. 4
Only a limited class of third parties is permitted access to patient
records; other than the patient and persons providing treatment, only the
37. Id. § 7100.1.10.1, 6 PA. BULL. at 2119.
38. In the past, many states have denied mental patients basic civil rights or made their
exercise subject to the discretion of the hospital director. Pennsylvania is no exception-one
statute denies absentee ballots, but was recently declared unconstitutional. McGill v. Alton,
No. 74-1164 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1976) (summarized in I MENT. DISAB. LAW RPTR. 19 (1976)).
There is clear evidence of a trend toward broader recognition of the rights of mental
patients. Some jurisdictions now provide full civil rights. Eg., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
123, §§ 23, 25 (Supp. 1976). A distinction should be drawn between admission to a mental
health facility, whether as a voluntary or involuntary patient, and a declaration of legal
incompetency. See generally Ennis, CivilLibertiesandMental Illness, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101
(1971); Developments, supra note 28, at 1198-1200.
39. Regs. §§ 7100.1.10.1-.4,6 PA. BULL. at 2119. Each patient, each patient's family and
attorney, and other interested parties are to be given a copy of the "Patient Bill of Rights," the
contents of which are spelled out in the regulations. Id. Many of the specific rights listed are
apparently derived from a portion of the MH-MRA not repealed by the MHPA, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 4423 (Purdon 1969).
Forced labor in mental institutions has met with critical comment and recent litigation,
with rulings that compensation must be paid. E.g., Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808
(D.D.C. 1973) (Fair Labor Standards Act held to apply); Downs v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 368
F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966)
(nontherapeutic forced labor violates the thirteenth amendment, even if wages paid). Some
states have responded by eliminating work programs, but one author asserts that this
interferes with the right to treatment-the same right cited in arguments against labor in
mental health facilities. Perlin, The Right to Voluntary, Compensated, Therapeutic Work as
Part of the Right to Treatment: A New Theory in the Aftermath of Souder, 7 SETON HALL L.
REv. 298 (1976).
40. Regs. § 7100.1.7.1,6 PA. BULL. at 2117-18. A denial on the basis that disclosurewill
interfere with treatment must be supported by substantial documentation by the treatment
team. Anonymity of informants can be preserved only if information was given under an
anonymity agreement. Such an agreement may be made only if the informant's safety would
be threatened by disclosure. Id.

county administrator of mental health, the courts and payors seeking to
verify that billed services have been provided may have access to the
records. 41 The qualified confidentiality of records should be compared to
the broader confidentiality for communications.
3. Confidentiality of Communications.-The Act states that
privileged communications, 42 either written or oral, shall not be disclosed
to anyone without the prior written consent of the patient, except for
purposes of anonymous data collection and the disclosures required under
the drug and alcohol abuse laws. 43 Regrettably, the Act does not protect the
privacy and confidentiality of non-privileged communications between
the patient and third parties who are either within or without the facility.
The regulations, however, have attempted to fill the gap. The patient has
the right to unrestricted and private communications, and mail is to be
sent and received unopened, although incoming mail may be examined in
the patient's presence for articles that pose a threat to the health or welfare
of the patient or others in the facility.
4. Remedies .- All of the rights given mental patients under the Act
and the regulations would be meaningless, of course, without some means
of enforcement. The Act requires detailed record keeping, but even this
may prove insufficient to assure compliance. Section 113 of the Act
therefore provides that the patient may use any of several procedural
remedies to enforce any right guaranteed under the Act or the laws of the
Commonwealth ."

III.

Voluntary Examination and Treatment
Included among persons whose rights are governed by the new
legislation are voluntary inpatients at Pennsylvania mental health
facilities-those who undergo examination and treatment as full or parttime residents on a voluntary basis.' The procedures for voluntary
admission depend upon the age of the individual.
A.

Persons Eighteen Years of Age or Older
Any person eighteen or older may apply to be accepted for examina41.

Regs. § 7100.1.7.2, 6 PA. BULL. at 2118.

42. The MHPA does not define what types of communications are privileged. Presumably doctor-patient communications are encompassed. A physician-patient privilege is recognized by statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (Purdon 1958). A recent statute creates a
psychologist-patient privilege along the lines of attorney-client privilege. See id. tit. 63, § 1213
(Purdon Supp. 1976).
43.
44.

MHPA § I11.
Regs. §§ 7100.1.10.3(l)(a),(b),(e), 6 PA. BULL. at 2119; cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§

4423(1),(2),(5) (Purdon 1969).
45. Actions requesting damages, declaratory judgment, injunction, mandamus,
writs of prohibition, habeas corpus, including challenges to the legality of detention
or degree of restraint, and any other remedies or relief granted by law may be
maintained in order to protect and effectuate the rights granted under this act.
MHPA § 113.
46. See MHPA § 103.

tion and treatment at a mental health facility. 47 It is the evident purpose of
the Act to assure that the informed consent of the individual is obtained. 48

Informed consent cannot be obtained, of course, unless the person fully
understands the type of treatment that he may undergo, the risks that are
involved and the alternatives that are available. 4 9 With mentally ill indi-

viduals there may be problems in obtaining informed consent: the very
illness that places a prospective patient in need of treatment may interfere

with his ability to understand what is explained to him. That the Act does
not give guidance for this situation poses a dilemma for any psychiatrist or
mental health care provider in deciding whether treatment may be voluntarily contracted or whether involuntary treatment procedures must be
initiated.50
Any voluntary inpatient may be requested to give additional consent

to remain in treatment for a period as long as seventy-two hours after he
gives written notice of his intent to withdraw. 51This provision in the law,
which is antithetical to true voluntary status, was enacted despite the

criticism of several persons appearing at the committee hearings on the
original bill.52 In effect, it permits limited involuntary confinement of a
voluntary patient without affording the safeguards built into the involuntary treatment procedures. 53 The law does not give the rationale for the
provision, but in the past such delay permitted the initiation of proceedings
for involuntary commitment. 54 To a limited degree the seventy-two hour
47. See id. § 201. This should be qualified by stating that such an individual must
"substantially [understand] the nature of voluntary commitment." Id.
48. Id. See id. §107 (treatment plan shall, to the extent possible, be made with
understanding and consent of the patient). See also note 28 supra.
49. Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1976) (informed consent to
medical treatment); Note, Medical Malpractice-A Question of Insurability, 80 DICK. L.
REv. 594, 596-604 (1976) (standards of informed consent to medical treatment).
Like the physician or surgeon, the psychiatrist is often faced with a dilemma in obtaining
consent. Too full an explanation of possible risks may cause anxiety and interfere with proper
treatment. Psychiatrists thus suggest that the standard of informed consent be flexible enough
to allow some discretion. Lebensohn, Problems in Obtaining Informed Consent for Electroshock Therapy, in ALLEN, supra note 7, at 386.
50. Involuntary treatment would be an alternative only if the person were "dangerous"
within the meaning of section 301 of the MHPA. See notes 78-90 and accompanying text infra.
If he were not "dangerous," then either treatment must be given on the basis of questionable
consent, or the person must be turned away. See also note 49 supra.
51. MHPA § 203. The requirement that notice must be written can lead to unjust results
if an individual is illiterate or incapable of writing, or has forgotten that the notice must be in
writing even though he was properly informed upon admission. The regulations attempt to
cure this weakness in the statute by providing that "[ulpon request to any clinical employee of
the treatment facility, a person seeking release from voluntary treatment shall be immediately
provided with [the proper form].
...
Regs. § 7100.2.6.1(A), 6 PA. BULL. at 2121.
52. Hearings, supra note 13 (statements of Frank S. Beal, Sec'y of Pub. Health &
Welfare; Berks County Mental Health Ass'n; Loren H. Roth, Dir. of Law & Psychia.
Program, Western Psychia. Instit.; Joseph F. Vargyas, Ass't Dir, of Mental Disab. Legal
Resource Center, ABA Comm'n on Mentally Disabled; Reid Warren, Pa. Ass'n of Community Mental Health/Mental Retardation Providers).
53. Involuntary treatment is conditioned upon a finding that the person is severely
mentally disabled and in need of treatment. It must be shown that the person poses a threat of
danger to himself or others. See MHPA § 301. See also notes 76-115 and accompanying text
infra.
54. Cf. Ferster, Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill: A Decade After the Ervin Act, in
ALLEN, supra note 7, at 284-85 (discussion of law applicable in D.C.). This is, in part, the
interpretation placed upon this provision by the Department of Public Welfare.

provision marks an improvement over the prior law, but in another sense it

is a step backward. The MH-MRA provided for "voluntary admission" under which the person could withdraw from treatment at any time,
but it also provided for "voluntary commitment" that could result in

detention as long as ten days following notice of intent to withdraw. 55 It
remains to be seen whether the seventy-two hour provision will have an
effect upon the number of voluntary inpatients; it may well discourage

voluntary admissions and thwart the purpose of the Act to assure the
availability of treatment to those who need it.
B.

Persons Fourteen to Eighteen Years of Age

The new law has made a significant step toward increasing the
availability of mental health care for persons fourteen to eighteen years old

by providing that they may apply for examination and treatment without
prior parental consent. 56 If a minor in this age group believes that he or she
is in need of treatment and has substantial understanding of the nature of

"voluntary commitment", 5 7 the application may be approved by the

director of the mental health facility to which it is addressed. Upon
acceptance of the application, however, the director must notify the
minor's parents or guardian, 58 who may then file an objection and be heard
59
by a judge or mental health review officer within seventy-two hours.

Parental consent is not an absolute prerequisite to treatment; the only
purpose of the hearing is to determine whether treatment is in the minor's
60
best interest.

Although the same standards of informed consent that apply to adults

apply to minors who seek admission, 6' the Act does not specifically state

whether the hearing held upon parental objection should also consider the
capacity of the minor to give informed consent. Under present law a minor
cannot give consent to medical treatment; the MHPA seems to carve out a
The treating facility may delay release ..
if the treatment team or its designee has
reason to believe that:
1. The individual is severely mentally disabled . . . [and] a petition for
involuntary treatment is to be filed ....
2. Immediate release would be medically dangerous to the health of the
individual.
Regs. § 7100 2.6.1.(D), 6 PA. BULL. at 2121. Whether these criteria are conjunctive or
disjunctive is not clear.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402(c), 4403(c) (Purdon 1969).
56. Compare MHPA § 201 with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, 99 4402(a), 4403(a) (Purdon
1969).
57. MHPA § 201. The use of the word commitment may be an oversight. See note 22
supra.
58. MHPA § 204.
59. Id.
60. Id. The result of this provision is that parents may not deny mental treatment if the
child is in need of it. Under former law even an emancipated minor needed parental consent to
obtain voluntary admission. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4403(a)(l)-(2) (Purdon 1969). The
only apparent means of circumventing parental consent was to have a relative, friend or "any
responsible person" initiate involuntary commitment proceedings which, of course, were
more complicated and difficult. Seeid. §4406 (civil court commitment); id. §4405 (emergency
examination and treatment, but only in cases of danger to self or others).
61. See MHPA § 201,203.

new exception to that general rule.6 2

C. Minors Under the Age of Fourteen
Although minors under fourteen may not personally apply for mental
treatment or examination, they may become "voluntary inpatients." A
parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to a minor under
fourteen may subject the child to examination and treatment and shall be
considered as acting for the child, according to section 201.63
In Bartley v. Kremens,64 which invalidated the MH-MRA counterpart to section 201 of the MHPA ,65 a federal district court held that
parents of a minor may not waive the constitutional rights of their child.
Plaintiffs in Bartley were minors who had been committed, over their own
objections, upon the application of their parents. Defendants 66 argued that
the due process rights of plaintiffs, if any, were effectively waived by the
parents. The court responded,
[I]f we could find that in all instances parents act in the best
interest of their children, we might also find that parents may
waive constitutional rights of their children. Unfortunately ..
this is not the case. In deciding to institutionalize their children,
parents, as well as guardians ad litem or persons standing in loco
parentis, may at times be acting against the interests of their
children. With this in mind we must agree . . . that, 'in the
absence of evidence that the child's interests have been fully
considered,' parents may not effectively waive personal constitutional rights of their children."'
The court declared that minors were entitled to certain due process
safeguards in the commitment procedure. Although a pre-commitment
hearing was not required, a hearing within a reasonable time, preferrably
seventy-two hours, 68 to establish probable cause for institutionalization
62. The general law with respect to a minor's consent to medical, dental and health
services is governed by statute. Any minor eighteen or older who has graduated from high
school, has married or "has been pregnant" may consent to treatment without the consent of
any other person. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10101 (Purdon Supp. 1976). Parental consent is
unnecessary for other minors to receive medical, dental or health treatment only if,
in the
physician's judgment, the delay resulting from an attempt to secure parental consent would
increase risk to life or health. Id. § 10104.
63. MHPA § 201.
64. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), probablejurisdiction noted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402(a)(2), 4403(a)(2) (Purdon 1969). It should be noted
that these provisions of MH-MRA applied to all persons eighteen years of age or younger.
MHPA §201 is parallel to these provisions only with respect to minors less than fourteen years
of age. See MHPA § 201.
66. Defendants were all state officials; among them were the director of the state
hospital where plaintiffs were confined and the Secretary of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 402 F. Supp. at 1044. The action was brought alleging deprivation
of civil rights under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 402 F. Supp. at
1041-42.
67. 402 F. Supp. at 1047-48 (footnotes omitted), citing Kent v. United States, 130 U.S.
App. D.C. 343, 401 F.2d 408 (1968) (Burger, J., dissenting); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71
(D. Neb. 1973); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally Comment, "Voluntary "Admission of Children to
Mental Hospitals:A Conflict of Interest Between Parentand Child, 36 MD. L. REV. 153 (1976).
68. The court phrased this in terms of a maximum period of detention: "In no event
shall detention of the child in the absence of a probable cause hearing exceed seventy-two (72)
hours from date of the initial detention." 402 F. Supp. at 1049.
Other courts concerned with a probable cause hearing have suggested alternative periods

was held to be necessary.'9 Following a determination of probable cause to
commit, due process dictates that a post-commitment hearing on the need
for commitment be held after no more than a two-week delay. 70 Further
guarantees of due process set forth by the court were adequate notice and
opportunity to be heard, assistance of counsel, the right to be present at any
hearing to present evidence and confront witnesses and, finally, the right to
have the need for commitment established by "clear and convincing
71
proof" rather than by a mere preponderance of evidence.
The MHPA does not provide all the procedural guarantees envisioned
by the majority of the district court in Bartley. Whether the new law is
subject to constitutional objection on this basis is a matter of uncertainty
since the Bartley court itself recognized that the state
has an interest in seeing that a procedural system will not deter
parents, already faced with this difficult decision [to institutionalize their children], from attempting to institutionalize
children who are in need of treatment only mental institutions
can provide. Further, to protect society and the individual child,
the state has an interest in the immediate detention
72 of children
who may be dangerous to themselves or others.
The new law seeks to strike a balance between the child's due process
rights and the need to provide a usable procedure by permitting "any
responsible party" to file a petition requesting that the child be withdrawn
from treatment or that the treatment be modified as the child's best interests
demand. Following such petition, a hearing is to be held within ten days
and the child is to be represented by appointed counsel. 73 This hearing is
not the probable cause hearing envisioned in Bartley, nor is it held within
seventy-two hours of the child's detention. Indeed, such a hearing may
never be held if no "responsible party" files a petition.
of maximum delay. Cf. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (adult, seven
days); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (adult, forty-eight hours), redecided, 379 F.
Supp. 1376 (D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975).
69. 402 F. Supp. at 1049.
70. A delay after the probable cause hearing is permissible. This delay will allow
the child to adjust to his new surroundings and will allow both the state and the child
time to prepare for the post-commitment hearing to come. It will also allow the state
time to examine and diagnose ....
Id.
In a footnote the court said that until legislation establishes an unbiased tribunal to
conduct these hearings, "the present facilities of the ... court system shallbe used ..
"
402 F. Supp. at 1049 n.18 (emphasis added). This raised a storm of protest in argument on
appeal to the Supreme Court; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeared as amicus curiae to
assert that an undue burden would be placed upon the court system by the order. See 45
U.S.L.W. 3405 (December 7, 1976).
71. 402 F. Supp. at 1049-53. District Judge Broderick dissented on the grounds that the
traditional interest of the state in preserving and maintaining parental control over young
children outweighed the child's interest in "the strict procedural due process requirements
imposed by the majority ....
" Id. at 1056. Apparently significant to his opinion was the
requirement that two independent psychiatric evaluations recommend institutionalization
before the parent could admit the child.
72. 402 F. Supp. at 1049. The court also noted that its ruling was "not intended to
preempt the state which is free to develop its own safeguards so long as they are as fully
effective as those which we set out." Id. at 1048-49 n.16.
73. MHPA § 206(b). The petition should be filed in the juvenile division of the court of
common pleas in the county of the minor's residence. The rules of juvenile proceedings apply.
Id.

Without the appointment of a guardian ad litem or counsel to represent
a child at the initial stages of the procedure for voluntary admission, it is
likely that the abuses that occurred under the prior law may continue .74 The
new law strikes a balance more in favor of providing mental health care
than of guaranteeing that no child will be unnecessarily confined in a
mental health facility. To that extent, it resists the Bartley court's tendency
to make the procedures for "voluntary" child treatment
practically indis75
tinguishable from involuntary treatment procedures.
IV.

Involuntary Examination and Treatment

A.

Substantive Aspects

Some procedural changes have been made in the law of involuntary
examination and treatment, but the most significant change is substantive.
Prior law permitted involuntary commitment if a person was shown to have
a mental disability making care at a mental health facility necessary or
desirable. 76 Harm or the threat of harm to himself or to others was a
prerequisite for emergency involuntary treatment, but not for ultimate
commitment. 77
1. "Severely Mentally Disabled."-The new law provides that
only persons who are "severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment" may be subjected to involuntary treatment and examination.78 The
key to the change brought about by the new law lies in the definition of
"severely mentally disabled."
A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of
mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment,
and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or
to care for his own personal need is so lessened that he poses a
clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.79
2. "Clear and Present Danger."-The statute sets forth specific
ways in which clear and present danger must be shown. The two broad
categories are danger to the patient himself 80 and danger to others. 8
74. This is not to say that all "voluntary admissions" of children abuse the law. Some
do, however. For an account of some admissions, see the summary by the Bartley court,
relying on stipulated facts in the pretrial order. 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1043-44.
75. The legislature anticipated that the provisions dealing with children might be
invalidated at some time. The severability provision will allow the remainder of the scheme
to survive. See MHPA § 503.
New Jersey has faced the problem of "voluntary" child commitments by a rule allowing
only temporary commitment without a court order. The rule applies if the minor does not
understand the nature of commitment or if his parent had him committed and he denies that he
wants treatment. In re Williams, 140 N.J. Super. 495, 356 A.2d 468 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. 1976).
76. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50. §§4404(b), 4405, 4406 (Purdon 1969). This standard for
involuntary commitment was ruled unnecessarily vague for circularity of definition. Goldy v.
Beal, No. 75-791 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 8, 1976).
77. Compare PA STAT. ANN.. tit. 50, § 4405 (Purdon 1969) with id. § 4406.
78. MHPA § 301(a), 304(a).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. Involuntary treatment of one who poses a danger only to himself rests upon the
parenspatriae power of the state-the power to protect the well-being of citizens who cannot
care for themselves. See In re Ballay, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648 (1973);
Developmens, supra note 28, at 1228.
81. MHPA § 301 (a). The power to order treatment of one who poses a danger to others
rests upon the police power of the state. See Developments, supra note 28, at 1228.

(a) Danger to self.-A clear and present danger to oneself can be
established by a demonstration of some overt act occurring within the past
thirty days. 82 The Act requires that the overt act be an attempted suicide, 83

an attempted self-mutilation, or a self-mutilation. 84 Clear and present
danger can also be demonstrated by a showing that the individual has acted
in a manner indicative of an inability to provide for his own nourishment,
shelter or safety without the assistance of others.85 Apparently a mere
threat of suicide or mutilation is not sufficient, although such a threat may
be an indication of mental illness. 6

A demonstration of any of the enumerated overt acts is not, of itself,
enough to warrant involuntary examination and treatment; it must also be
shown that there is a "reasonable probability" that death, serious bodily
injury or serious physical debilitation will ensue if adequate treatment is
87
not afforded under the Act.
(b) Danger to others.-Once again, the acts upon which a finding of
dangerousness can be made must have occurred within the past thirty

days. 88 An infliction or attempt to inflict "serious bodily harm on another"
must be shown; a threat is not enough. 89 Of course, the infliction of harm or
attempt to inflict harm must be accompanied by, and result from, mental
illness. Moreover, there must be evidence of a reasonable probability that
90
such conduct will reoccur.
B.

ProceduralAspects

The new law provides two procedures whereby a person may be
subjected to involuntary examination and treatment. When there is a need
for immediate treatment, it provides a procedure for emergency examination and treatment. In other situations, a procedure for court-ordered

examination and treatment must be followed.
82. MHPA § 301(b)(2).
83. Id. § 301(b)(2)(ii).
84. Id. § 301(b)(2)(iii).
85. Id. § 301(b)(2)(i).
86. See Hearings,supra note 13 (statement of Dr. W. Camp, Council of Psychiatric
Service Providers of the Hosp. Ass'n of Pa.).
87. MHPA § 301(b)(2). In an extensive article examining the reliability and validity of
psychiatric judgements it was concluded that psychiatrists cannot reliably predict dangerousness. The authors suggested that commitment on the basis of a prediction of dangerousness
not be permitted without proof that the person had actually done or threatened something
dangerous in the recent past. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatryand the Presumption of Expertise:
FlippingCoins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 749 (1974).
88. MHPA § 301 (b)(1). An exception is made for cases in which a person has been found
incompetent to stand trial or has been acquitted by reason of lack of criminal responsibility on
charges involving actual or attempted infliction of bodily harm. By establishing that the
conduct charged actually occurred, clear and present danger can be established although the
occurrence was not within the past thirty days, provided that the proceedings for involuntary
examination and treatment were filed within thirty days of the criminal court's finding or
verdict. Id. § 301(a).
Persons charged with a crime may be subjected to involuntary examination and treatment
as if not so charged. See id. §§ 401(a), 406. See also notes 122-45 and accompanying text
infra.
89. See MHPA § 301(b)(l).
90. Id. §§ 301(a), 301(b)(l).

1. Emergency Examination and Treatment.-Emergency examination may be made upon the certification of a physician, upon a warrant
issued by the county administrator of mental health, or upon application of
a person who has personally observed conduct indicative of a need for
mental examination. 9 ' The individual may be taken to a mental health
facility where a physician must examine him within two hours to determine
whether he is mentally disabled, dangerous to himself or others, and in
immediate need of treatment.9293Only when and if those three criteria are
satisfied may treatment begin.

The individual is entitled to be informed of the reasons for his
detention and is to be given the use of a phone to contact other persons. The
director of the mental health facility has a duty to request the names of

persons who should be notified of the individual's custody and to give them
notice. The director or the administrator is also responsibile to ensure that
the health and safety of the individual's dependents are safeguarded and
that his property is secured, although it is not clear what financial resources
may be drawn upon to satisfy this requirement. 94
2. Extended Emergency Treatment.- Patients may be detained no
more than seventy-two hours for emergency treatment unless a certification is filed by the common pleas judge or the review officer granting an
91. Emergency examination may be undertaken at a treatment facility upon the
certification of a physician stating the need for such examination; or upon a warrant
issued by the county administrator authorizing such examination; or without a
warrant upon application by a physician or other authorized person who has
personally observed conduct showing the need for such examination.
(1) Warrant for Emergency Examination.-Upon written application by a
physician or other responsible party setting forth facts constituting reasonable
grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment, the county administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person
authorized by him, or any peace officer, to take such person to the facility specified
in the warrant.
(2) Emergency Examination Without a Warrant.- Upon personal observation
of the conduct of a person constituting reasonable grounds to believe that he is
severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, any physician or
peace officer, or anyone authorized by the county administrator may take such
person to an approved facility for an emergency examination. Upon arrival, he
shall make a written statement setting forth the grounds for believing the person to
be in need of such examination.
MHPA § 302(a). See also Regs. § 7100.3.3.3, 6 PA. BULL. at 2122.
92. MHPA § 302(b).
There is some authority that an individual has a right to remain silent during an
examination to determine whether he should be involuntarily committed or treated. Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Wis. 1972); Commonwealth exrel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa.
Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975) (plurality opinion). It has been argued, however, that the
state's interest inprotecting the public or the person outweighs the right to privacy, which is
the mainstay of the right to silence in the examination context. Developments, supra note 28,
at 1303-13; accord, State v. O'Neill, 274 Ore. 59, 545 P.2d 97 (1976).
93. See MHPA § 302(b); Regs. §§ 7100.3.3.5-.6, 6 PA. BULL. at 2123. Treatment is to be
"limited to the purposes of responding to the emergency and to performing diagnosis and
evaluation . . .and that necessary treatment required to provide health and safety to the
individual and to others," unless voluntary, informed consent to additional treatment is
obtained. Regs. § 7100.3.3.6(F), 6 PA. BULL. at 2123.
94. See MI-PA § 302(c); Regs. 7100.3.3.4(c), 6 PA. BULL. at 2123. The regulations state
only that the local administrator is responsible for establishing procedures to carry out these
responsibilities and that "[s]uch procedures shall be based on the availability of resources
within the community." Regs. § 7100.3.3.4(E).

extension. 9" The detention period may be extended as much as twenty
days, but no extension may be granted unless an informal hearing is held
and a review of the status of the individual and the need for treatment is
made by a judge or review off icer. 96 The patient is entitled to representation
by counsel, who should be appointed for him immediately after the filing of
the application for an extension. In wording somewhat different from that
customarily applied to Miranda situations, the legislature has provided
that the court "shall appoint an attorney. . . unless it shall appear that the
97
person can afford, and desires to have, private representation."

3. Court-Ordered Involuntary Treatment.-The law permits only
one twenty-day extension of emergency treatment. Following such an
extension, treatment can be continued only if the person voluntarily admits

himself or, if he is still severely mentally disabled and in need of care, a
petition for court-ordered involuntary treatment is filed. 98
Emergency treatment is not a prerequisite to court-ordered treatment.
Persons who are severely mentally disabled within the meaning of that
term, 99 but who are not necessarily in need of immediate emergency
treatment, can be subjected to treatment under the procedures of section
304(c).1 °° "Any responsible party" may initiate involuntary treatment
proceedings by petition to the court of common pleas. 1 01 The court, after

determining that the petition sets forth reasonable cause, must appoint an
attorney to represent the subject of the petition at a hearing to be held within
95. See MHPA §§ 302(d)(2), 303(c). The Act clearly states that a person in emergency
treatment must be discharged within seventy-two hours unless he voluntarily admits himself
or the certification is filed. Mere filing of an application for extension would not suffice to
stop the running of the seventy-two-hour clock. Since the court, or the review officer
authorized by the court, must conduct an informal hearing within twenty-four hours of receipt
of the application and not necessarily sooner, time is of the essence if the person is to be
confined for more than seventy-two hours. Moreover, since the statute makes no exception
for weekends or holidays, a person brought in for emergency treatment on a Friday evening is
almost assured of discharge on Monday. It remains to be seen whether the courts, even with
the assistance of review officers, will be able to process applications for extensions rapidly
enough.

96. See id. §§ 303(c)-(d).
97. Id. § 303(b) (emphasis added); accord, id. § 304(c)(3). Compare with this the
statement in Miranda that a person being interrogated "is entitled to a lawyer and ... if he
cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided." 384 U.S. at 474. Note the different emphasis.
Under the MHPA it appears that anyone not desiring private representation is entitled to
appointed counsel. This certainly poses a potential strain on whatever funds are to be used to
provide such representation. The Act does not specify where the funds are to be found, nor
does it appropriate any funds. See MHPA § 303(b). But cf.id.§ 304(d) (funds for assistance of
mental health expert in involuntary, court-ordered treatment proceedings to be charged
against local mental health program).
98. MHPA §§ 303(h)(l)-(2). There is an apparent conflict between two provisions of the
Act. Section 303(h) requires discharge after twenty days of extended emergency treatment
unless within that period "the court orders involuntary treatment pursuant to section 304."
Id. § 303(h)(2) (emphasis added). Yet the Act also provides that "[t]reatment shall be
permitted to be maintained pending the determination of the petition." Id. § 304(b)(5).
The regulations do little to clear the confusion: "Involuntary treatment . . . may be
continued pending the determination of the petition subject to any other limitation on the
period of involuntary treatment." Regs. § 7100.3.5.2(M), 6 PA. BULL. at 2125.
99. See notes 78-90 and accompanying text supra.
100. MHPA § 304(c).
101. Id. § 304(c)(1). Venue rests originally in the court of the county in which the
subject of the proceedings is located or resides. Id. § 115.

a reasonable time. 10 2 The court may order the person to undergo an
outpatient examination before the hearing; at such an examination the
person is entitled to the presence of his counsel. 0 3
The statute accords the individual several rights at the involuntary
treatment hearing. He is entitled not only to counsel, but to the assistance of
a mental health expert at the expense of the local mental health program if
necessary. 104 He is entitled to receive a copy of the report of the psychiatric
examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist. 10 5 The hearing is to be
public unless a request is made by the individual that it be private, and the
rights of confrontation, cross-examination and refusal to be called as a
06
witness are explicitly provided.1
In accord with recent court decisions that involuntary confinement
cannot be ordered upon less than clear and convincing evidence, 0 7 the
statute so provides in section 304(f). 1°8 When such evidence has been
presented, the court may order treatment as either an inpatient t°9 or
outpatient for a period not exceeding ninety days, or in some cases, one
10
year.1
4. Additional Periods of Involuntary Treatment.-Although the
initial period of confinement cannot exceed the limits just mentioned, at the
expiration of the period the court may, upon application by the county
102. Id. § 304(c)(3). The appointment of counsel is governed by the same rule
whether or not one is already subject to involuntary treatment. See note 97 and accompanying
text supra.

The court "shall . . . set a date for the hearing as soon as practicable," MHPA §
304(c)(3), but the subject of the proceedings must be served with a copy of the petition at least
three days before the hearing. Id. § 304(c)(4).
103. The law mandates that such examination must be as an outpatient: "Upon motion of
either the petitioner or the person, or upon its own motion, the court may order the person to
be examined by a psychiatrist appointed by the court. Such examination shall be conducted
on an outpatient basis ....." Id. § 304(c)(5) (emphasis added).
The right to presence of counsel during the examination is expressly provided in section
304(c)(5) of the MHPA. Psychiatrists would argue that the presence of counsel may reduce the
effectiveness of the interview and the testing. See Hearings,supranote 13 (statements of Dr.
W. Camp, Council on Psychiatric Service Providers of the Hosp. Ass'n of Pa.; R. Warren,
Pennsylvania Ass'n of Community Mental Health/Mental Retardation Providers).
104. MHPA § 304(d).
105. Id. § 304(c)(5)
106. Id. § 304(e)(2)-(4).
107. E.g., In re Ballay, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648 (1973) (beyond reasonable
doubt); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (clear, unequivocal and
convincing); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 197 1) (clear, unequivocal
and convincing) (dictum); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155,339
A.2d 764 (1975) (at least clear and convincing).
108. MHPA § 304(f).
109. Inpatient treatment shall be deemed appropriate only after full consideration
has been given to less restrictive alternatives. Investigation of treatment alternatives shall include consideration of the person's relationship to his community and
family, his employment possibilities, all available community resources, and
guardianship services. An order for inpatient treatment shall include findings on
this issue.
Id. Accord, Regs. § 7100.3.5.5(B), 6 PA- BULt. at 2126.
110. Ninety days is the general rule. The exception is made only when a finding of
incompetency to stand trial or a verdict of acquittal for lack of criminal responsibility has been
entered and dangerousness is based on past conduct giving rise to any of the following
criminal charges: murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, rape, or
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. MHPA § 304(g). This distinction may be subject to
attack on equal protection grounds.

administrator or the facility director,"' conduct a hearing and order
another period of treatment. Not only must the individual's condition at the
initiation of his treatment have warranted involuntary treatment, but a
further finding of a need for treatment must be made upon the basis of the
person's conduct during the intervening period, although it need not be shown
that a new dangerous act was committed within the past thirty days." 2 This
process of rehearings and renewed orders for involuntary confinement may
be repeated as long as the requirements for involuntary treatment exist. Of
course the director of a facility has a duty to discharge any individual whose
condition no longer warrants treatment.' 13
Persons who have been involuntarily treated on the basis that there
was a clear and present danger to themselves are accorded an additional
safeguard by the law. Unless it is determined that it is not in the person's
best interest, an additional period of full-time inpatient treatment cannot be
ordered until the person "has first been released to a less restrictive
alternative." 4 This safeguard seems appropriate when the underlying
rationale of the treatment is protection of the individual, not society. 115 It
provides an opportunity to observe the individual in a less restrictive
environment and to determine if he has regained the capacity to exercise
judgment and discretion in his own affairs and to provide for his own needs
without the assistance of others.
V.

The MHPA and the Criminal Law

Following the same general pattern as its predecessor, 116 the MHPA
contains several provisions to deal with matters of criminal law and the
treatment of mentally ill prisoners. 117 The Act delineates the manner in
which a prisoner may be subjected to involuntary examination and treatment, defines incompetency to stand trial, and directs the manner in which
issues of criminal responsibility are to be tried.
A.

Involuntary Examination and Treatment of Persons Charged with
Crimes or Under Sentence

A person charged with a crime or under sentence who is "severely
mentally disabled" may be subjected to involuntary examination and
treatment under the civil provisions of the Act in the "same manner as if he
were not so charged or sentenced. '" 118 There are only a few special
provisions-time spent in mental health treatment is credited against any
11. Id. § 305. Application must be made at least five days prior to termination of the
existing court order. Regs. § 7100.3.6(A), 6 PA. BULL. at 2126.
112. MHPA. §§ 304(a), 305.
113. Id. § 304(g)(2).
114. Id.§ 305.
115. See note 80 supra.
116. Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-704
(Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1976).
117. MHPA §§ 401-06.
118. Id. § 401(a).

criminal sentence; inpatient mental health treatment must be given at a
mental health facility; security provisions are not to be affected by a
transfer to a mental health facility; and, upon
discharge from treatment, the
9
custody."
to
returned
be
to
is
individual
B.

Incompetence to Stand Trial

Incompetence to stand trial must properly be given special statutory
treatment, for the issues involved in a determination of incompetency are
different than those involved in involuntary examination and treatment.
Incompetence to stand trial is defined by the new Act as being "substantially unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings. . . or to

participate and assist in [the] defense."

20 A

person may be incompetent to

stand trial, yet have "capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and

discretion in the conduct of his affairs.

...121

This distinction between incompetence to stand trial and the sort of
mental disability required before civil commitment may be ordered has

always existed; it is now sharper because dangerousness is required for
involuntary treatment. Despite the historical distinctions, the incompetent
defendant in the past was often committed to mental health facilities

without regard to whether he was in need of care or had any prospect for
achieving competence to stand trial. 22
In a recent case, Jackson v. Indiana, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that a state could not indefinitely confine an individual found
incompetent to stand trial without employing the same standards used in
civil commitment proceedings.' 23 In light of the Jackson decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a defend-

ant's commitment under the MH-MRA in Commonwealth v. McQuaid. 24
'
119. See id. §§ 401(a)-(c). In addition to the special provisions listed in the text, the Act
does not permit initiation of proceedings for involuntary treatment at a Veterans Administration facility if that requires preparation of competency reports or the facility is required to
maintain custody of the person. Id. § 401(a). The obvious purpose is to ensure that the
Commonwealth, not the federal agency, retains control. Transfer may be made to a VA
facility once involuntary treatment has been ordered, provided neither custody nor control is
required, since the person transferred may not be returned to state custody. See id. § 401(b).
120. See id. § 402. This codifies the general rule of law. See, e.g., United States v.
Masthers, 539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Pogany, 465 F.2d72 (3d Cir. 1972);
State v. Spivey, 65 N.J. 21, 319 A.2d 461 (1974); Commonwealth v. Melton, - Pa. -, 351
A.2d 221 (1976); Commonwealth v. Ruza, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 9, 352 A.2d 94 (1975).
121.
MHPA § 402. See United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976) (noncommitability is not relevant to competence to stand trial); cf. Commonwealth v. Bruno, - Pa. -,
352 A.2d 40 (1976) (test is not one of insanity).
122. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715(1972); Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 464
Pa. 499, 347 A.2d 465 (1975).
123. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The court wrote,
We hold . . . that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is
committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held
more than a reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it
is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the
customary civil commitment proceeding . . . or release the defendant.
Id. at 738.
124. 464 Pa. 499, 347 A.2d 465 (1975).

McQuaid had been charged with murder, but was committed to
Farview State Hospital in 1960 when it was determined that he was
incompetent to stand trial. No rehearing on the issue of his incompetence
was held until 1974, when he filed a motion to commence trial. Although
the lower court concluded that the statutory scheme afforded McQuaid the
same protections given persons involuntarily confined under the civil
provisions of the MH-MRA, the supreme court did not agree. 25 The court
found that the standards for determining incompetence to stand trial and
those used for involuntary civil commitment were far different, and ruled
that indefinite commitment under the more lenient standards of incompe126
tence to stand trial was a denial of equal protection.
The MHPA meets the constitutional requirements of Jackson and
McQuaid by disallowing indefinite commitment of persons found incompetent to stand trial. If the court "is reasonably certain that . . . involuntary treatment will provide the defendant with the capacity to stand trial,"
it may order such treatment only for as long as thirty days without a finding
of "severe mental disability." 27 The law also places a maximum limit on
the time any defendant may be criminally detained on the basis that he is
incompetent to stand trial:
Nor shall he in any event be detained on the criminal charge
longer than the reasonable period . . . necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that
capacity in the foreseeable future. If the court determines there
is no such probability, it shall discharge the person. Otherwise,
he may continue to be criminally detained so long as such
probability exists but in no event longer than [the maximum
sentence for the crime charged or five years, whichever is
less]. 128
Before there is a stay of criminal proceedings or detention of a
defendant on the ground of incompetence to stand trial, there must be a
judicial determination of incompetency. The procedures for such a deter29
mination are covered in great detail by the MHPA. 1
1. Incompetency Examination.-TheCommonwealth, the defendant, the defense counsel, or the person in charge of the facility in which a
defendant is detained may apply to the court for an order directing that an
examination of the defendant be made to determine if he is competent to
stand trial. Such an order may be issued upon application or by the court's
own motion without a hearing unless the defendant objects. 30 The
examination must be given on an outpatient basis and the defendant is
13
entitled to the presence of counsel.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 506, 347 A.2d at 469.
Id. at 517, 347 A.2d at 475.
MHPA § 402(b).
Id. § 403(d).

129.
130.

See id. §§ 402, 403.
Id. §§ 402(c)-(d). Failure of counsel to raise the issue of competency has been held

not to be a waiver. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 456 Pa. 313, 318 A.2d 724 (1974).

131.

MHPA §§ 402(e)(1), 402(e)(3). A New Jersey court has ruled that a refusal to allow

The procedural safeguards accorded the defendant extend beyond the

presence of counsel. He is entitled to retain a psychiatrist, at public expense
if necessary, whenever he has a substantial objection to the conclusions
reached by the court-appointed psychiatrist who conducted the examination. 3 2 The court may also allow either the prosecution or the defense to

have a retained psychiatrist present during the examination.1 33 Anything
said or done by the defendant during the examination, however, may be
34
used as evidence only on the issue of the defendant's mental condition. 1

2. Incompetency Hearing.-Within twenty days after the court
receives the examination report, a decision on the competency of the
defendant must be rendered. 35 The party moving for a determination of

incompetency has the burden of proving it by clear and convincing
evidence. 136 Upon a determination of incompetency, the criminal proceed-

ings may be stayed for a period of five years or the length of the maximum
sentence for the crime charged, whichever is less. 137 During the stay, the
defendant is to be examined by the court-appointed psychiatrist not less
38
than once each sixty days.'
C.

Criminal Responsibility

The hearing on the issue of competency to stand trial may also serve as
the forum for a determination of criminal responsibility, 139 obviating the
delay and waste that might occur should the determination await trial. The
law gives the court discretion to hear evidence on responsibility at the
incompetency hearing and then, should the evidence warrant, to enter a

judgment of acquittal. 11 If no acquittal is entered, the issue of responsibilthe presence of counsel during examination of a criminal defendant did not deny the right to
assistance of counsel when the examining psychiatrists asserted that the effectiveness of the
examination would be reduced. The court said, however, that consideration should be given
to the use of sound recording or the like. State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965);
accord, United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 67 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Albright, 388
F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1968).
See also notes 92, 103, supra.
132. Id. § 402(f). Contrast this to the provision for paid professional assistance for
persons subjected to involuntary commitment proceedings under § 304. There is no requirement under § 304 that the subject of the proceedings have a substantial objection to the report
of a court-appointed psychiatrist before he may be allowed fees for an expert to assist in his
preparation and presentation. See MHPA § 304(d). Of course, the aim of section 402 differs
from that of section 304; the former concerns a finding of incompetency to stand trial whereas
it is under the latter that actual involuntary treatment may be ordered. Nevertheless,
temporary involuntary treatment may be ordered under MHPA § 402(b) largely upon the basis
of the incompetency examination.
133. MHPA § 402(f).
134. Id. § 402(e)(3). See also note 92 supra.
135. Provided the hearing is not continued on defendant's request. Id. § 402(g).
136. Id. § 403(a).
137. Id. § 403(f).
138. Id. § 403 (c). Of course, if an addition to the determination of incompetency to stand
trial, the court orders involuntary treatment using the civil involuntary treatment standards,
see id. § 406, defendant should be reexamined at least once each thirty days in order to comply
with another provision of the Act, id. § 108(a).
139. Id. § 404.
140. Id. § 404(a).

ity may again be raised at trial, and the court may direct that it be
considered by a separate jury or otherwise decided apart from other
issues 4 . in the interest of fairness and an orderly procedure.
The overall effect of the provisions dealing with persons charged with
crime is to assure due and orderly process in the resolution of matters
dealing with the defendant's mental state. Although tailored to the unique
problems faced in the criminal justice system, the criminal provisions are
in harmony with the overall tone of the MHPA-to ensure that due process
and adequate treatment are provided for all persons who are mentally ill.
VI.

Conclusion

The Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 represents Pennsylvania's
response to two recent demands upon the mental health care system-that
it afford due process as well as adequate care to all its patients. Whether any
mental health legislation can adequately accommodate both of these
demands remains to be seen. All that can be said for the Act is that it
attempts to resolve the conflicts between them.
Civil libertarians may argue that the Act does not go far enough in
protecting individuals from unnecessary confinement against their willthat, for example, it still permits children to be confined over their
objections and without a hearing. Those engaged in providing mental
health care may argue that the procedural complexities and the new
dangerousness standard will prevent many from obtaining the treatment
they need.
It is clear that the Act will impose delays and costs upon both the
mental health and judicial systems. The demands of due process will
require increased judicial intervention in the admission and treatment of the
mentally ill; the duty to provide adequate treatment and to continually
monitor every patient may overtax the mental health care facilities. With
experience and fortitude, it is to be hoped those faced with implementing
the goals of the Act can make it work.
PAUL A. LUNDEEN

141.

Id. § 404(c).

